4 Commits

Author	SHA1	Message	Date
UNITRONIX	648a8d4f8a	security(3.4): harden console and Go server for pre-release audit ... Commit web-nodejs lockfile with tar override; CI uses npm ci and moderate npm audit. Add LOG_LEVEL filtering and log redaction in Node console and Go server. Validate WS tokens on bd-signal; require single-use token for remote-agent relay. Limit active relay sessions per IP and block open enrollment without TLS.	2026-07-12 20:44:46 +02:00
Knienartowicz	8da6f8c9fd	security: fix 3 critical + 3 high findings from production audit ... Critical: - C-01: WebSocket Origin validation (CSWSH protection) via new middleware/wsOrigin.js, applied to wsRelay, chatRelay, remoteRelay, bdRelay, cdapTerminalProxy, cdapMediaProxy - C-02: Remove Tauri Origin-based CSRF bypass in server.js; only /api/bd/* skipped - C-03: Update vulnerable deps (express 4.21.2, multer 2.0.0, protobufjs 7.4.0, helmet 7.2.0, axios 1.9.0, cookie-parser 1.4.7, express-session 1.18.1) High: - H-01: Disable auto-create-local-user on login by default; opt-in via BETTERDESK_AUTH_AUTOCREATE=true (does not affect ensureDefaultAdmin fresh-install bootstrap) - H-02: Bearer-only auth for /api/bd/*; session cookie fallback removed; tokens redacted in logs - H-05: Replace custom PBKDF2 with golang.org/x/crypto/pbkdf2; 600k iterations; new format pbkdf2-sha256\\\ with backward-compat for legacy salt:hash Backward compatibility: legacy password hashes still verify; CSRF tokens still obtainable via csrfTokenProvider; fresh-install admin bootstrap (.admin_credentials flow) unchanged. Audit report: docs/security/AUDIT_PRODUCTION_2026-04-10.md This commit was made possible thanks to Insolve.	2026-05-26 13:35:12 +02:00
UNITRONIX	ab6adff56f	fix(security): harden login and audit endpoints	2026-04-26 02:09:44 +02:00
UNITRONIX	95f2beb744	feat: organizations, desktop mode, i18n (ja/ko/ru), security docs, client i18n integration	2026-03-25 20:27:04 +01:00