Files
Oliver Kieselbach fa640ebe61 fix(security): resolve CodeQL log-forging findings and suppress by-design queries
Bucket B (real fixes) + Bucket A (config) of the CodeQL alert triage.

Log-forging (cs/log-forging, 8 sinks): add Helpers/LogSanitizer that strips
CR/LF and other control characters, and apply it to the logged copy of every
user-controlled value in AuthenticationMiddleware, PolicyEnforcementMiddleware
(Invoke + DecideAsync), McpQuotaEnforcementMiddleware and TableUserUsageRepository.
Only the logged value is sanitized — routing, authorization and storage keys are
untouched, so tracing fidelity for legitimate values (paths, UPNs, GUIDs) is
preserved. Structured logging already isolated the fields; this closes the CRLF
vector as defense-in-depth and clears the query.

Three genuine JS/TS fixes:
- guardValidation.ts: replace the no-op `.replace(/%/g, "%")` with a real
  escapeRegExp() — the author intended to escape; this also closes the latent
  metacharacter gap (js/identity-replacement).
- access-guard.ts: use a `%s` format argument instead of interpolating the UPN
  into the console.error format string (js/tainted-format-string).
- docs-corpus.ts: strip HTML tags with a loop-until-stable stripHtmlTags() so the
  sanitizer is robust and recognized as complete (js/incomplete-multi-char-sanitization).

CodeQL config: filter the two queries that fire structurally on this codebase,
where the flagged behavior is the feature — cs/exposure-of-sensitive-information
(audit/notification logs legitimately record the actor UPN / recipient email) and
cs/cleartext-storage-of-sensitive-information (rate limiters key on the trusted
client IP). Default suites stay active; genuine one-off false positives from other
queries are dismissed individually so those queries stay sharp.

Tests: Backend xUnit 3110 (+9 LogSanitizer), MCP vitest 19 (+1 tag-strip),
Web vitest 49, all tsc clean.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-22 01:38:47 +02:00
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