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Oliver Kieselbach
e86f7efed3
The SHA-256 check proves the ZIP is the one version.json names, but that manifest lives in the same container as the ZIP: it cannot outlive a compromise of the download host. The expected publisher travels inside this script, which the loader verified before running it, so the chain from the file an administrator assigns to the process that starts is publisher-anchored end to end. Install-AutopilotMonitor.ps1 v2.4 -> v2.5: - Get-UnverifiedAgentBinaries checks every AutopilotMonitor.*.exe/.dll in the extracted payload for status Valid and the same subject pin the loader carries; the gate runs immediately before --install and throws on any rejection, exactly like the hash check. - Third-party assemblies keep their own publisher's signature and are not checked: System.Management.Automation.dll ships unsigned, so a gate over all files would refuse the live payload. - An extracted folder with no binary of ours is a rejection, not a pass. - The SHA-256 manifest check is unchanged and still runs first: it proves the bytes, the signature proves the author. Verified against the live payload 2.0.1454 (all five of our PEs Valid and glueckkanja AG, gate passes); appending one byte to AutopilotMonitor.Shared.dll makes it reject. Pester 55/55. The portal privacy and about pages carried the pre-signing wording and are corrected in the same change. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>