Files
AutopilotMonitor/docs/index.md
T
Oliver Kieselbach 90012d9a66 feat(agent): verify Secure Boot CA-2023 state against firmware, not just servicing registry
Customer report: ANALYZE-SEC-001 warned on devices whose firmware already
carried the Windows UEFI CA 2023 certificate — the agent only read the
SecureBoot\Servicing registry value, which mirrors the Windows Update
rollout and lags behind reality (OEM factory image, WinCS, WU not run yet).

Agent: new UefiSecureBootCertReader reads the UEFI db/KEK variables
natively (GetFirmwareEnvironmentVariableExW; SeSystemEnvironmentPrivilege
enabled on the process token and restored — first privilege-adjustment
code in the repo). Fail-soft, never throws; legacy BIOS maps to not_uefi.
secureboot_status gains per-certificate booleans, uefiFirmwareReadStatus,
and the one-sided marker uefiCa2023FirmwareConfirmed (emitted only on
positive confirmation, never as false).

Rule v3.0.0: not_exists precondition on the marker suppresses the rule
when the firmware confirms the certificate; the marker's absence keeps
old agents on exact v2 behavior, so the rule is safe to seed before the
agent rollout. Firmware-verified-missing raises confidence (+20 db,
+10 KEK 2K CA 2023).

Verified: full solution build; backend 3201, agent 1988, web 582 tests
green; tsc/ajv clean; elevated cross-check on real firmware matches
Get-SecureBootUEFI on all seven certificate probes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-23 14:07:01 +02:00

4.4 KiB

okf_version
okf_version
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Autopilot Monitor — Technical Knowledge Bundle

Contributor-facing technical documentation for Autopilot Monitor, organized as an Open Knowledge Format (OKF) knowledge bundle. Customer-facing product documentation lives at https://docs.autopilotmonitor.com (separate repository).

Architecture

  • Architecture Guide - High-level architecture overview and solution layout for contributors.
  • Version Contract - One version shape for agent, backend and MCP: the ETag-CAS counter blob that mints build numbers, and the manifests published only after a deploy is verified live.
  • URL Registry - Every well-known host lives in one registry file per component (Constants.cs / utils/config.ts / src/config.ts), enforced by guard tests; includes the agent-download migration to the download alias and its deploy-order constraint.

Agent

  • V2 Agent - How the on-device agent works: runtime overview, decision engine (reducer, signals, completion arms), logs & persistence (signal log, snapshot, crash recovery), Hello wizard un-skip (why a single "WHfB disabled" read never decides completion), Autopilot ZTD diagnostics (event IDs, diagnostic registry, endpoints, error-code map).
  • Build Counter Blob - How agent build numbers are minted: shared counter blob with ETag-CAS so local and CI builds never collide; CI additionally attests build provenance (Sigstore).
  • Agent Endpoint Migration - How the backend re-homes agents to a new API base URL via the config channel (backend move or per-tenant region move): live-fetch-only, allowlist-validated on both sides, one hop, kill wins.
  • MDM Reboot Coalescing - Attributing the mid-ESP coalesced reboot ("second sign-in") to the device-assigned policy URIs that forced it: aggregated DM-Enterprise 2800 observations (neutral, flush-time watermark) + the ANALYZE-ESP-005 advisory gated on an actually-observed reboot.
  • Secure Boot CA-2023 Detection - Why ANALYZE-SEC-001 v3 reads the UEFI db/KEK variables directly instead of trusting the SecureBoot\Servicing registry, and how the one-sided uefiCa2023FirmwareConfirmed marker plus a not_exists precondition give absence-tolerant suppression across old and new agents.

Rules

  • Gather Rule Phase Scoping, One-Shot Triggers & Emit-on-Change - Restricting gather rules to enrollment phases (activePhases / activeFromPhase sticky latch), one-shot collection at a phase's start/end (phase_change / phase_exit), and emitMode "on_change" result-dedup.
  • Gather Rule Guardrails - Why the allowlists in rules/guardrails.json are enforced on the agent and nowhere else, which hard blocks survive unrestricted mode, and the rule that every collector must call a guard and emit security_warning on refusal.

Backend

  • Business Timestamps - Why the Azure Tables system Timestamp is never authoritative (migrations reset it), and the OccurredUtc + RowKey-decode compensation for AuditLogs/OpsEvents/Events after the 2026-07-18 migration.

MCP Server

  • MCP Docs Corpus - How the published customer documentation becomes the search_docs corpus: CRLF-safe heading chunking, build-time embedding as a third precomputed section, and why a docs edit needs an MCP redeploy.

Security & Identity

  • MCP OAuth Flow - Who authenticates where when connecting an AI client to the MCP server; two identities, three parties plus Entra ID.

Conventions for this bundle

  • Every concept document is a markdown file with YAML frontmatter; type is mandatory, title, description, resource, tags, and timestamp are recommended.
  • Use standard relative markdown links between documents (e.g. agent/overview.md, ../architecture.md). Do NOT use the spec's /-prefixed bundle-absolute form — GitHub resolves those against the repo root (missing /docs) and navigation breaks.
  • Record notable additions and changes in log.md.
  • index.md and log.md are reserved names — never use them for concept documents.