Bucket B (real fixes) + Bucket A (config) of the CodeQL alert triage.
Log-forging (cs/log-forging, 8 sinks): add Helpers/LogSanitizer that strips
CR/LF and other control characters, and apply it to the logged copy of every
user-controlled value in AuthenticationMiddleware, PolicyEnforcementMiddleware
(Invoke + DecideAsync), McpQuotaEnforcementMiddleware and TableUserUsageRepository.
Only the logged value is sanitized — routing, authorization and storage keys are
untouched, so tracing fidelity for legitimate values (paths, UPNs, GUIDs) is
preserved. Structured logging already isolated the fields; this closes the CRLF
vector as defense-in-depth and clears the query.
Three genuine JS/TS fixes:
- guardValidation.ts: replace the no-op `.replace(/%/g, "%")` with a real
escapeRegExp() — the author intended to escape; this also closes the latent
metacharacter gap (js/identity-replacement).
- access-guard.ts: use a `%s` format argument instead of interpolating the UPN
into the console.error format string (js/tainted-format-string).
- docs-corpus.ts: strip HTML tags with a loop-until-stable stripHtmlTags() so the
sanitizer is robust and recognized as complete (js/incomplete-multi-char-sanitization).
CodeQL config: filter the two queries that fire structurally on this codebase,
where the flagged behavior is the feature — cs/exposure-of-sensitive-information
(audit/notification logs legitimately record the actor UPN / recipient email) and
cs/cleartext-storage-of-sensitive-information (rate limiters key on the trusted
client IP). Default suites stay active; genuine one-off false positives from other
queries are dismissed individually so those queries stay sharp.
Tests: Backend xUnit 3110 (+9 LogSanitizer), MCP vitest 19 (+1 tag-strip),
Web vitest 49, all tsc clean.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
LogParserCollector and EventLogCollector called no guard at all, while
File/Json/Xml did — and rules/gather-rules.md already promised customers
that log-parser paths were allowlisted. A tenant admin could author a
logparser rule against C:\Users via POST /api/rules/gather and have up to
1000 lines uploaded as telemetry, bypassing the hard C:\Users block the
same page guarantees; eventlog could read any channel, Security included.
The backend validates no collectorType, target, or parameters, so the
agent is the only place this can be enforced.
Both now guard. logparser cannot check rule.Target directly (GetFullPath
throws on a wildcard), so it checks the directory for wildcard targets and
re-checks each resolved path. Event log channels get an allowlist matched
on a "/" boundary. Hard-blocked channels live in a C# constant rather than
guardrails.json: a parse error drops the allowlists to empty, which is
fail-closed, but would have lifted a block sourced from the same file.
Also fixes an inert timeout in CommandCollector: ReadToEnd() blocks until
the pipe closes, so WaitForExit(30000) was only reached once the process
had already exited and a hung command pinned its worker indefinitely.
Adds the first real CI gate. No workflow ran tests on a pull request — the
deploy workflows build without testing and build-agent.yml covered only
DecisionCore.Tests on manual dispatch — while trust/security-faq.md
already told customers automated tests run in CI. ci.yml now runs all six
suites on every PR and merge, plus a job that fails on generated-guardrail
drift, alongside CodeQL and Dependabot. OfficeBinaryWatcherTests is marked
SerialThreading; its bounded re-probe races the shared ThreadPool and
failed once under full-suite load.
Verified: 3101 backend, 1911 agent V2, 474 decision core, 44 dialog, 572
web, 447 MCP. The timeout fix is verified by runtime, not assertion — a
Start-Sleep 120 command now returns after ~30s.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Oliver Kieselbach