When RecordImeVersionAsync reports a genuinely new IME version (~monthly),
EventIngestProcessor now also enqueues an ime-msi-archive job. The worker
(QueuePollingWorker, heartbeat, pause on ImeMsiArchivingEnabled=false)
downloads the installer and stores it write-once (If-None-Match:*) in the
permanent ime-archive container ({version}/IntuneWindowsAgent.msi +
provenance.json), then merges MsiArchiveStatus/BlobPath/Sha256/Bytes/SourceUrl
onto the ImeVersionHistory row - so every fleet-observed IME build stays
available for decompilation/diffing after Microsoft's versionless CDN moves on.
The download URL comes from agent telemetry (msiDownloadUrl enrichment) and is
treated as untrusted: https-only *.manage.microsoft.com allowlist with exact
filename match, canonical versionless fallback, no redirects, size cap
(MaxImeMsiDownloadSizeMB, default 250, preflight + mid-stream) enforced by a
SHA-256-hashing pass-through stream. Archiver never throws; the worker retries
only transient statuses (download/timeout/error), permanent rejections
complete with their Failed:* status persisted.
Admin settings ImeMsiArchivingEnabled (default true) + MaxImeMsiDownloadSizeMB
via the full 4-file web chain; archive fields on the version-history API are
GA-only (non-GA projection unchanged, redaction tests extended). Shared
manifests regenerated. Tests: archiver status branches via recording subclass
(allowlist, caps, 409 idempotency, cancellation propagation), config defaults.
Backend suite 4262 green, web tsc + vitest 762 green, solution 0 warnings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-consent, verify and flip collapse into the existing consent flow: the
consent URL funnels legacy-homed tenants to the primary app registration,
and consent-status/access-check verify admin consent via an app-only token
probe under explicit primary credentials, then auto-flip HomedAppClientId.
- AdminConfiguration.SelfServiceAppHomingEnabled: kill switch (default off,
cache-bypassing fail-closed read); gates funnel + auto-flip + tenant-admin
manual flip. GA path deliberately survives the kill switch.
- POST config/{tenantId}/app-homing (TenantAdminOrGA): tenant admins flip to
primary only, probe-gated; GA gets force + revert. Pure decision helper
EvaluateManualFlip shared by function and tests.
- GraphTokenService.GetAccessTokenForAppAsync: probe seam with explicit app
credentials, cache-safe via app-scoped token keys.
- EntraAppRolesEnabled does not block a flip; it emits a Warning ops event
(AppHomingFlippedWithEntraRoles) reminding to re-assign enterprise-app roles.
- Web: homing badge + "App Registration Homing" panel with confirm dialog in
GA tenant management (typed homedAppClientId hardens the PUT round-trip),
funnel/success banners in tenant settings with switchAuthApp re-login,
admin-config kill-switch round-trip, ops event types dual-registered.
- Browser telemetry (App Insights): pre-init event buffer so module-init auth
events survive; strategic events across the whole flow (app_homing_flipped,
consent_flow_*, consent_verify_failed, auth_app_fallback_*, auth_app_switched,
auth_app_homing_learned, app_homing_manual_flip*).
Backend must deploy before web (additive JSON fields); everything is inert
while EntraId:LegacyClientId is unset. Enable the kill switch in the admin
portal after the dual app-reg config swap.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GetExcessiveDataSendersAsync gated on LastEventAt - StartedAt alone. No event
count, no bytes, no rate — the name asserted something the code never checked.
What it actually selected was every enrollment session that spanned a night,
which for Autopilot is the ordinary case: device unboxed in the evening, ESP
runs, machine powered off, user signs in the next morning.
The per-device alerts from the previous commit made this visible. All three
devices blocked at the time of the analysis were false positives:
CND3320949 / 64ed21e8 23 events over 15.5h (1.5 events/hour)
5CG4303CPT / db5751bc 192 events over 16.8h (blocked mid Account Setup 1/5)
PF5YANFB / 2069de87 781 events over 31.5h
14 such blocks in 30 days across 9 customer tenants. Over the same window the
event-count detector fired 5 times and was right every time (2742, 2714, 2712,
2506 events). Each false block costs a live enrollment 8 hours of telemetry.
Repairing it rather than removing it does not pay: once a volume condition is
added, "many events AND long span" is a subset of "many events", which is what
the count detector already does. Volume is the quantity that costs anything; a
23-event session spanning 15 hours costs nothing. So the detector, its two admin
settings, the ExcessiveDataBlocked ops event and the portal section go, and the
event-count path is the only automatic block left.
MaxSessionWindowHours and MaintenanceBlockDurationHours are deleted rather than
deprecated: the config row is written with Replace, so the columns drop out on
the next portal save, and nothing reads them meanwhile. A comment on the
surviving detector records why there is no second one, so it does not get
rebuilt a year from now.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Re-home agents to a new API base URL through the agent/config response
(backend move or per-tenant EU->US region move) - the lesson from the
2026-07-18 WEU->GWC cutover, where the compiled-in API hostname hard-cut
every in-flight agent (no DNS indirection possible: mTLS breaks behind a
proxy, Flex custom-domain TLS is broken).
Backend (ConfigVersion 33):
- AdminConfiguration.AgentMigrateApiBaseUrl (global) +
AgentMigrateTenantOverridesJson (tenantId->URL; empty value pins a
tenant against the global target; override wins)
- GetAgentConfigFunction.ResolveMigrateTarget serves the validated target;
AgentMigrateServed / AgentMigrateRejected warnings as delivery evidence
- TableConfigRepository Store+Map; admin portal Global Settings round-trip
Agent (kill-switch-mirrored hardening):
- Shared AgentEndpointMigrationRules: https-only, *.azurewebsites.net on a
label boundary, no path/port/userinfo - enforced on BOTH sides
- Live fetch only: RemoteConfigService cache strips the field on write AND
read; EndpointMigration.ResolveTarget re-checks the fetch outcome
- AgentRuntimeConfig.Resolve returns before merge/integrity/bootstrap
cleanup on a pending migration (no spurious IntegrityCheckFailed against
a stale migration stub), Program.RunAgent rebuilds Phase 3+4 against the
new URL - single hop, kill signal wins before and after the hop
Tests: AgentEndpointMigrationTests (backend rules + resolution),
EndpointMigrationTests + cache-hardening strip (agent). Full suites green
(Functions 2992, Agent Core 1822, vitest 557, tsc silent).
Doc: docs/agent/endpoint-migration.md
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The V1 agent line is retired: no new V1 sessions since 2026-05-09, only
orphaned straggler traffic remained on /api/agent/ingest (last seen
2026-06-29, events for long-cleaned-up sessions). Bootstrap/Intune/CI
have deployed V2-only since the v2 cutover.
Agent:
- Delete AutopilotMonitor.Agent, .Agent.Core, .Agent.Core.Tests
(projects + sln entries). V2 trio, SummaryDialog, DecisionCore.Tests
and V2Isolation.targets stay.
Backend:
- Relocate the shared statics/DTOs V2 reused from the V1 partials
(StampServerFields, SanitizeEventTimestamps, IsMaxLifetimeAgentShutdown,
RecalculateAppDurations, EventClassification, AppInstallAggregationState)
into EventIngestProcessor; IngestEventsOutput moves next to
IngestTelemetryFunction (same namespace, zero ripple).
- Delete IngestEventsFunction (route agent/ingest), BootstrapIngestEvents
(route bootstrap/ingest), NdjsonParser and their DI registration.
EventDataNormalizer stays (used by TelemetryPayloadParser).
- Drop both routes from EndpointAccessPolicyCatalog and
RequestTelemetryMiddleware.TenantHeaderTrustedPaths.
- Retire the V1 update-hash oracle: LatestAgentV1*/LatestBootstrapV1*
fields + GetAgentLine case 1 (default arm returns empty hashes, so
stragglers gracefully skip the integrity check; ParseAgentMajor keeps
its default of 1 on purpose — defaulting to 2 would feed V2 hashes to
V1 binaries). TableConfigRepository Store+Map updated in lockstep.
- Remove ApiEndpoints.IngestEvents/.BootstrapIngestEvents constants.
Tests: NdjsonParserTests deleted; timestamp/critical-path/max-lifetime
tests repointed to EventIngestProcessor; the two NDJSON pipeline tests
removed (coverage retained by direct-list siblings); catalog/no-store
InlineData rows updated.
Docs: architecture.md (endpoint tables, ingest flow diagram, solution
layout, test matrix), web SectionAgentInternals endpoint tables,
build.ps1 help text.
Azure: no config change needed — /api/agent is not in the client-cert
exclusion paths (agent/ingest was always cert-enforced) and the
/api/bootstrap prefix exclusion remains for the surviving bootstrap
routes (verified via ARM on autopilotmonitor-api).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
GlobalReader = cross-tenant READ visibility like a Global Admin, but no mutating
operations and no platform settings. Provisioned exactly like a GA: a GlobalAdmins
table row with Role=GlobalReader (empty/legacy Role = GlobalAdmin, back-compat).
Semantics are ADDITIVE — a user who is also their own tenant's Admin keeps edit
rights on that tenant; a pure GlobalReader is read-only everywhere.
Backend:
- GlobalAdmins.Role column + GlobalAdminService.GetGlobalRoleAsync; IsGlobalAdminAsync
(incl. TableAdminRepository) delegates so a GlobalReader row never reads back as admin
- RequestContext.IsGlobalReader + HasGlobalScope
- Split GlobalAdminOnly into GlobalReadOrAdmin (cross-tenant reads) vs GlobalAdminOnly
(writes/settings) + TenantAdminOrGlobalReader for config-read
- PolicyEnforcementMiddleware: extracted testable DecideAsync seam; cross-tenant gate keys
off HasGlobalScope; additive own-tenant role carried so IsTenantAdmin stays correct
- Config secret redaction for readers (RedactedCopyForReader) + save-time placeholder
restore (RestoreRedactedSecretsFrom) so a redacted view can't blank real secrets
- raw table/log tools stay GlobalAdminOnly; SignalR global-admins read group admits HasGlobalScope
- /auth/me emits isGlobalReader (+ preview-gate bypass, no auto-admin); /auth/mcp emits globalRole
MCP: hasGlobalScope (GA or Reader) drives routing + tool catalog; raw secret-bearing tools
(query_table/list_tables/query_backend_logs) gated strict-GA only.
Web: AuthContext isGlobalReader + hasGlobalScope; reader reaches /dashboard + cross-tenant
views; platform Settings/Ops/Backups/Software GA-only (nav-hidden + requireGlobalAdmin route
layouts); mutating controls on mixed data pages disabled via useCanMutatePlatform; rules pages
read-only on foreign tenants; additive own-tenant edit preserved.
Tests: backend 2369, MCP 252, web 469 green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a second, higher threshold to the runaway-session detector that
auto-blocks or auto-kills the device (admin-selectable mode), so the
existing 2000-event warn keeps observing while the harder action runs
unattended at e.g. 2500 events. Both tiers stay independently
idempotent per session and the maintenance batch picks them up in a
single query pass.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Cascade-delete V2 is the only path now. Drops the per-tenant
EnableCascadeDeleteV2 flag, the legacy ETag-CAS-guarded DeleteSessionAsync
helper, the AppInstallSummaries cleanup helper (only legacy caller),
and the SessionsLegacyDeleted counter chain (fanout → maintenance → OpsEvent).
DeleteSessionFunction collapses to a single kill-switch gate; the producer
owns 404 / 409 / Poisoned mapping AND the intentional Queued/Preparing+Snapshot
→ 202 recovery resume — gating those at HTTP would strand crashed admin
cascades. Fanout now aborts both the inner loop AND outer loop on producer
KillSwitchActive instead of leaking calls into the next tenant.
Test coverage:
- DeleteSessionCasGuardTests removed (helper gone)
- AdminConfigurationSessionDeletionKillSwitchTests trimmed to kill-switch only
- DeleteSessionFunctionTests pinned to the kill-switch short-circuit + null
- SessionRetentionFanoutServiceTests: legacy path tests dropped, two new
abort regressions for producer KillSwitchActive (inner + outer loop)
Build: 0 warnings, 0 errors. Backend: 1526 passed / 0 failed.
Web: tsc clean, vitest 346 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
DAD liveness (3 new state-change-only events, NOT periodic, max 3 per
detector lifetime): desktop_detector_started / _first_poll /
_no_candidate. Distinguishes "agent dead post-reboot" from "DAD wiring
broken" from "user never logged in" in sessions missing desktop_arrived
(the ca9e3c59 timeout pattern). Threshold via global AdminConfiguration
.DesktopDetectorNoCandidateTimeoutMinutes (default 10, 0 = disabled),
round-trip wired through TableConfigRepository, GetAgentConfigFunction
(ConfigVersion 27 -> 28), CollectorConfiguration, DefaultComponentFactory,
DesktopArrivalHost + admin UI. Also fixes a peripheral-loss bug: V2's
DesktopArrivalDetector.OnTraceEvent callback was never wired, so the
existing desktop_excluded_user and desktop_real_user_detected events
were dead code in V2. Now routed via InformationalEventPost in the host.
Shutdown gap closure (4 new agent_shutting_down emit paths): ctrl_c,
process_exit, unhandled_exception (with exception type + 500-char-
truncated message), runtime_host_exit (defensive finally fallback).
Cross-path Interlocked idempotency gate shared with EnrollmentTermination
Handler via new tryClaimShutdownEvent ctor param prevents double-emit
when Ctrl+C races a real Terminated transition.
Event-type unification (V2 only): CreateAuthThresholdHandler now emits
agent_shutting_down with data.reason=auth_failure (was agent_shutdown).
EnrollmentTerminationHandler reason vocabulary unified to lowercased
tags (decision_terminal, max_lifetime). V1 keeps legacy agent_shutdown
(phasing out). Web/MCP consumers (eventHelpers, whiteGloveSplit test
fixtures, gather-rules eventTypes catalog, MCP semantic-event list,
docs) treat both as synonyms.
Tests: 3411 green (1538 backend + 1065 V2 core + 530 V1 core + 294
DecisionCore + 347 vitest). TypeScript noEmit clean. 5 new DAD-liveness
tests, 5 new gap-path tests, 2 new idempotency tests, 3 reason-vocab
updates.
Not in this PR: cross-process death detection for the actual ca9e3c59
silent-post-reboot-death pattern (Logon-Trigger / external watchdog) -
separate follow-up.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
PR3 of the safe cascade-delete plan
(.claude/plans/session-deletion-cascade-safe.md). Substantial PR per
plan §16 — adds the concurrency state-machine, the single-chokepoint
SessionDeletionGuard, the producer that builds manifest + uploads
blobs + enqueues the worker envelope, and the read-only preview
endpoint Global Admins use to verify a cascade plan before flipping
EnableCascadeDeleteV2 on. Wiring the guard at the 9 writer sites is
intentionally deferred to PR5 — no cascade actually fires until PR5
calls the producer from DeleteSessionFunction, so PR3 ships as
infrastructure-only.
== State machine + guard infrastructure ==
SessionDeletionState (Shared, Plan §1 P7 / §16-R2):
None | Preparing | Queued | Running | Poisoned. Completed deliberately
omitted — the cascade FINAL step removes the row, so "completed" is
observable via row-absence + progress.completedAt, not via a stable
state value. IsValidTransition(from, to) enforces the legal edges
(None→Preparing, Preparing→{Queued,None,Poisoned}, Queued→{Running,
Poisoned}, Running→Poisoned, Poisoned→None) and treats null/empty
legacy rows as None.
SessionDeletionLockedException carries (TenantId, SessionId,
CallerContext, CurrentState, ManifestId) for audit + log lines.
SessionDeletionGuard (Plan §1 P7 + §16-R13):
- ThrowIfLocked(TableEntity sessionRow, callerContext) — piggyback
variant for hot paths that already loaded the Sessions row; zero
added I/O. Caller must include DeletionState +
PendingDeletionManifestId in its select projection.
- EnsureWritableAsync(tenantId, sessionId, callerContext) —
standalone variant for paths with no existing read; one Get
round-trip via the PR1 ISessionDeletionInventoryReader seam.
Both paths throw the same exception. Per §16-R13 framing the guard
is "best-effort fast-fail, not safety" — correctness lives in §1 P4
live verification + poison + §13 restore-from-poisoned (PR4).
== Sessions row state-machine columns ==
SessionSummary.DeletionState (string) +
SessionSummary.PendingDeletionManifestId (string?) — added to the DTO
+ MapToSessionSummary read path. Empty/null means no cascade in flight
(legacy rows; treated as None per the guard contract). The producer
writes both columns via direct CAS via the new helper; existing
session-write paths don't need to know about them in PR3.
TableStorageService.CasSetSessionDeletionStateAsync — new partial
helper. Read-then-CAS on Sessions row, returns a structured
SessionDeletionStateCasResult (Updated | SessionMissing | WrongState |
EtagConflict) so the producer can branch correctly. Stamps newManifestId
on transition to Preparing; clears it on transition back to None
(poisoned-recovery restore).
== Producer + preview endpoint ==
SessionDeletionProducer.EnqueueAsync(tenantId, sessionId, reason,
actor) — Plan §5 PR3 step sequence: kill-switch check → CAS None→
Preparing with new ManifestId → DeletionManifestBuilder.BuildAsync →
BlobStorageService.UploadDeletionManifestAsync → UploadInitial-
DeletionProgressAsync (new helper for the mutable .progress.json
sibling) → audit deletion_started → CAS Preparing→Queued → enqueue
SessionDeletionEnvelope to Constants.QueueNames.SessionDeletion.
Returns SessionDeletionEnqueueOutcome enum so PR5/PR6 callers
translate per their UX (admin → 409 on AlreadyInFlight, maintenance
→ skip+audit). Crash recovery contract: row stuck in Preparing with
no progress blob → maintenance GC clears after 1h (PR6); Queued/
Running/Poisoned NEVER auto-cleared.
GET /api/admin/sessions/{sessionId}/delete/preview?mode={summary|full|
download} — GlobalAdminOnly per the EndpointAccessPolicyCatalog (per
memory feedback_route_policy_catalog). Three modes:
- summary: preflightCounts + sample (PK, RK) per step + estimated
snapshot bytes + builderDurationMs + schemaHash.
- full: entire manifest JSON inline (every row dump, every decrement
key) — byte-level review of "what would be deleted".
- download: gzipped *.snapshot.json.gz with Content-Disposition
attachment, identical bytes to what the real cascade would upload.
NEVER mutates state, NEVER uploads a blob, NEVER enqueues. Calls the
guard only as a hint (in-flight cascades surface in the response, no
lock acquired). Audits deletion_preview per Plan §7.
== Configuration changes (with web round-trip) ==
AdminConfiguration.SessionDeletionKillSwitch (bool, default false,
Plan §1 P8 / §9) — global emergency stop. When true, V2 producer +
legacy direct-delete return 503; PR4 worker pauses on entry. Round-
tripped through TableConfigRepository Store + Map AND the 4-file web
chain (AdminConfigContext.tsx, AdminConfigSettingsSection.tsx,
SectionGlobalSettings.tsx, types/adminConfig.ts) per memory
feedback_admin_config_ui_roundtrip — without it, every admin Save
silently clobbers the field back to false. UI surfaces a red checkbox
with explanatory copy.
TenantConfiguration.EnableCascadeDeleteV2 (bool, default false) —
per-tenant rollout flag. When true, PR5 admin-delete + PR6 retention
fanout build a manifest + enqueue; when false, legacy direct-delete
runs. Per-tenant flag selects PATH; global kill-switch halts BOTH.
Constants.QueueNames.SessionDeletion = "session-deletion" — worker
queue name.
Shared envelope SessionDeletionEnvelope { TenantId, SessionId,
ManifestId, Reason, EnqueuedAt } — wire shape between producer and
PR4 worker.
== DI ==
Program.cs registers SessionDeletionGuard + SessionDeletionProducer
as singletons next to the existing DeletionManifestBuilder.
== Tests (50 new, backend suite 1340/1340 green) ==
- SessionDeletionStateTests (10) — IsLocked over every state value
including legacy null/empty, IsValidTransition over every legal
edge, explicit rejection of illegal edges, "Completed is not a
state" guarantee.
- SessionDeletionGuardTests (8) — null row no-op, every lock state
throws with correct exception fields, missing-session no-op,
context propagation in the exception.
- SessionDeletionProducerTests (7) — kill-switch returns
KillSwitchActive without downstream calls; SessionMissing /
AlreadyInFlight / Poisoned outcomes from CAS; happy path verifies
all 7 steps in order via Mock.Verify; CAS-2 failure leaves snapshot
uploaded but no queue message; producer's pre-allocated ManifestId
flows to both the snapshot blob and the CAS marker (consistency
invariant the worker depends on).
- AdminConfigurationSessionDeletionKillSwitchTests (6) — both flags
default false on new config + on CreateDefault, true persists.
Wiring 9 sites with the guard (telemetry V1+V2 ingest, mark-success/
failed, server actions, maintenance marker, re-analyze handler,
vulnerability handler, manual rescan, index reconcile) deferred to
PR5 — no cascade fires in PR3, so the guard is dormant.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Background
----------
The in-memory SlaNotificationThrottleService kept its 4h cooldown in a process-
local ConcurrentDictionary. On Flex Consumption the Function host recycles
between 2h timer fires, wiping the dictionary, so the throttle was effectively
a no-op — observed in production as tenant b54dc1af receiving an SLA breach
notification every 2 hours for days on end (1 failed of 11-13 sessions, target
95%, success rate 91-92%).
Design
------
One row per tenant in a new SlaTenantStatus table (PartitionKey = tenantId,
RowKey = "status"). Flat schema with {Type}_* property prefixes for the four
breach kinds (SuccessRate, Duration, AppInstall, ConsecutiveFailures); one row,
one Upsert per evaluation cycle. Rationale documented inline: per-type rows
would be over-normalised for the access pattern (always all-types-per-tenant),
and ~50 tenants x 4 types = max 200 rows ever.
Throttle correctness
--------------------
The throttle decision (now - LastNotifiedAt >= cooldown) and the LastNotifiedAt
write happen in the same TryUpsertAsync(status, ifMatchETag) call. Two parallel
inline calls cannot both succeed in sending the same notification — the loser
gets a 412 from Table Storage, refetches, sees the updated watermark, and
either skips or schedules a new claim attempt. Up to 4 retries; on exhausted
retries we drop the notification rather than risk double-fire (at-most-once).
Cooldown is configurable: AdminConfiguration.SlaNotificationCooldownHours
(default 24, range 1-168). UI round-trip wired through the four required
files (AdminConfigContext, AdminConfigSettingsSection, types/adminConfig.ts,
SectionGlobalSettings).
Resolve path
------------
When a previously-active breach is no longer detected, the row transitions to
IsActive=false + ResolvedAt=now and a single sla_resolved notification fires.
Orphan sweep: tenants whose toggles get turned off while a breach is active
fall out of the qualifying loop, so the timer now also scans every status row
and silently clears any IsActive that no longer has a toggle backing it
(no resolved notification — the tenant disabled SLA, they don't care).
Per-type notes
--------------
- SuccessRate breach notifies with the configured warn-threshold, not the SLA
target — a 94% rate against target=99% / threshold=95% reads "below 95%",
not "below 99%".
- AppInstall now actually evaluates (the toggle was wired but evaluation was
missing). Aligned to the same ISO-week window the dashboard uses
(SlaMetricsService.GetIsoWeekKey), so notifications cannot diverge from the
/sla page. Sample-size floor of 5 apps per week, same as the dashboard.
- AppInstall has its own notification template (own title/summary/facts plus
TopFailingApp fact) — the builder used to silently fall through to the
Duration template for everything not SuccessRate.
- Telemetry Period tag derived from breachType: CurrentMonth for SuccessRate
and Duration, CurrentWeek for AppInstall — so AppInsights / ops dashboards
don't group AppInstall under the wrong period.
- AppInstall ops events now carry the actual installer totals (10 evaluated,
4 failed) instead of 0/0.
- ConsecutiveFailures: inline (ingest) path detects breaches, timer path
detects resolve. Both paths write to the same row through the same CAS
retry loop.
Clock injection
---------------
SlaBreachEvaluationService takes an optional Func<DateTime> nowProvider
(default () => DateTime.UtcNow) so the week-window regression test runs
deterministically on every test day instead of silently skipping when today
happens to fall in the first ISO week of the month.
Removed
-------
- SlaNotificationThrottleService and its tests. The in-memory model is gone;
there is no scenario where it would be wanted alongside the persistent row.
Tests
-----
- 21 new lifecycle + mapping + telemetry tests (CAS conflict + retry, CAS
exhausted-retries drops notification, threshold-not-target in notification,
orphan clearing, AppInstall template / week-window / totals, ConsecutiveFailures
inline persistence, multi-type race-probe, period-mapping theory).
- Backend xUnit: 1218 passed.
- Web vitest: 266 passed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Replaces V1/V2-hardcoded build + bootstrap with a single parametric
pipeline that scales to V3+ without rewrites. Full architecture in
.claude/plans/v2-cutover.md.
Stable namespace (Bootstrap-side, never renamed): generic Bootstrap
script, agent owns its --install defaults so it works for any line.
Versioned namespace (per-line, SelfUpdater-side): isolated *-v{N}.*
blobs; SelfUpdater never crosses lines or touches stable.
Backend GetAgentConfig dispatches per X-Agent-Version-Major to
AdminConfiguration.GetAgentLine(int) -> LatestAgentV{N}* fields.
Future V3 = add field set + switch arm. TableConfigRepository.Map
falls back to legacy unsuffixed columns for transparent migration.
V1 SelfUpdater now reads version-v1.json (would have been clobbered
by the V2 cutover otherwise). V2 agent owns its own 600s TenantId-wait
default so the Bootstrap calls --install plain.
Tests: 3289 across 6 suites, all green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
EventID 1010 (Autopilot.dll WIL hardwareinfo.cpp HRESULT 0x80070002 /
file-not-found probe) is a known noise event with no enrollment impact.
Downgraded to Debug across V1+V2 trackers, shared default list, admin
config fallback, and web UI defaults. ConfigVersion bumped 26 -> 27.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a separate "Sync MSRC" admin button next to "Sync KEV" so MSRC can be
refreshed on demand instead of waiting for the daily 03:00 UTC timer. KEV
and MSRC now have independent "Last Sync" timestamps surfaced in the UI,
and the daily timer only bumps the timestamp of phases that actually
succeeded — a partial failure is now observable via a stale timestamp
rather than being masked by a single combined value.
Backend:
- New POST /api/vulnerability/sync-msrc → MsrcCorrelationService.RefreshAsync,
GlobalAdminOnly, returns msrcCves/msrcDocs/msrcDocsFailed/durationMs
- AdminConfiguration.MsrcLastSyncUtc + Store/Map round-trip
- VulnerabilityDataSync writes KEV/MSRC timestamps independently
Web:
- Sync MSRC button (blue) + two timestamps in Data Sync Status card
- handleSyncMsrc + msrcLastSyncUtc round-trip via existing AdminConfig spread
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds the async fan-out producer path from Plan §2.8 / §M5.d so primary
Signals + DecisionTransitions rows can be projected onto their index
tables without blocking the hot ingest loop.
Components:
- Constants.QueueNames.TelemetryIndexReconcile (azure-queue-name-safe,
all lowercase + hyphens).
- IndexReconcileEnvelope (Shared DTO, flat shape with nullable fields
per SourceKind="Signal"/"DecisionTransition"). Avoids polymorphic
Newtonsoft deserialization — see M5.c.3 finding.
- IndexReconcileEnvelopeFactory pure static helper (FromSignal /
FromDecisionTransition / BuildBatch) — state-less projection.
- IIndexReconcileProducer (Shared interface) contract: no-op when
the feature flag is off; never rethrows underlying-queue failures.
- AzureQueueIndexReconcileProducer (Functions) — Base64-encoded JSON
messages, lazy CreateIfNotExistsAsync guarded by Interlocked flag,
Managed-Identity-or-connection-string construction mirroring
BlobStorageService / TableStorageService.
- IngestTelemetryFunction ctor gains IIndexReconcileProducer; after
primary Signals + DecisionTransitions commit it builds envelopes
and enqueues them. Event path is untouched (events don't feed the
index tables per §2.8).
- Program.cs registers the producer as a singleton.
Feature gate (AdminConfiguration.EnableIndexDualWrite, default false):
- New bool field in AdminConfiguration.
- TableConfigRepository Store + Map extension (per
feedback_table_storage_serialization).
- Producer checks config each call via AdminConfigurationService's
5-min memory cache. Flag off → primary behaviour is bit-exact.
Fault tolerance: queue-side exceptions (network, throttling, missing
queue before first CreateIfNotExists) are logged per envelope and
swallowed. The primary row is the source of truth; the 2h reconcile
timer (M5.d.4) is the safety-net recovery path.
Tests (+11 in Functions):
- 5 IndexReconcileEnvelopeFactoryTests: Signal/DecisionTransition
projection, dead-end preservation, batch ordering, null/empty.
- 3 IndexReconcileEnvelopeSerializationTests: Newtonsoft round-trip
(Signal, full DecisionTransition, minimal-envelope tolerance).
- 3 AdminConfigurationEnableIndexDualWriteTests: default-false on
new config + CreateDefault, persists when set.
Deferred to later sub-milestones:
- M5.d.3: queue-triggered consumer that maps envelopes to 0–3 index
rows using M5.d.1 TableIndexRepository.
- M5.d.4: 2h reconcile timer + release-gate dual-write verification
tests, then flip EnableIndexDualWrite=true in prod admin config.
Full Functions suite: 672 green (prev 661 + 11 new). Full solution
build green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The V2-agent AgentConfigResponse schema has carried four fields the backend
was expected to populate (Plan §M5): LatestAgentSha256, LatestAgentExeSha256,
AllowAgentDowngrade, and WhiteGloveSealingPatternIds. The first three were
already wired through adminConfig; the last one was declared on the DTO but
never populated from storage — V2 agents always received an empty list,
effectively leaving the sealing-pattern emission path dead.
Adds the missing plumbing:
- AdminConfiguration.WhiteGloveSealingPatternIdsJson (string, JSON-serialised
List<string>) + GetWhiteGloveSealingPatternIds() helper. Defaults to empty
for null/whitespace/invalid JSON so the feature stays off by default
(M3-compatible, no regression on tenants that haven't opted in).
Global-only, no per-tenant override (plan §M5 M4.4.5.e decision).
- TableConfigRepository Store + Map entries for the new column
(feedback_table_storage_serialization — new model properties MUST round-trip
through the table mapping or the field silently drops on save/load).
- GetAgentConfigFunction populates WhiteGloveSealingPatternIds from
adminConfig.GetWhiteGloveSealingPatternIds(). ConfigVersion bumped 25 → 26
as a semantic-change marker.
5 new tests mirror the HarmlessEventIds pattern (null / whitespace / invalid
JSON / valid round-trip / explicit empty array). 605/605 backend tests green.
Agent-side (M4.4.4 / M4.4.5.e): the V2 agent's OnPatternMatched hook already
reads WhiteGloveSealingPatternIds from the cached config and re-emits
matching IME pattern hits as WhiteGloveSealingPatternDetected DecisionSignals.
With this commit the data path is end-to-end.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The post-config binary integrity check was comparing the running EXE's
SHA-256 against LatestAgentSha256 which is the hash of the ZIP package —
these can never match. Introduces LatestAgentExeSha256 as a separate hash
computed from AutopilotMonitor.Agent.exe at build time, flowing through
AdminConfiguration → AgentConfigResponse → MonitoringService.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Oliver Kieselbach