The certificate's Intune managedDevice id is looked up in the tenant's Intune. With the tenant
switch ValidateIntuneDeviceBinding on, that lookup is the last accepting link of the validator
chain: an enrolled device that is not being retired, wiped or deleted is admitted as
ValidatorType.IntuneEnrollment. A 404 for a certificate younger than 60 minutes is
NotFoundRecentEnrollment (503, never cached); a missing grant is 503 with 120 s.
For devices another validator admitted, the lookup only observes: in the background, never
admitting or rejecting, and only when the app token carries
DeviceManagementManagedDevices.Read.All, so a tenant without the add-on costs no Graph call.
Outcomes ride on the request row (CertDeviceBinding, role, serial match, owner and enrollment
type).
TenantConfiguration.HasAnyDeviceValidation() is the single gate precondition; the feature flags
expose it as deviceValidationEnabled (replaces validateAutopilotDevice).
The agent parses ValidatorType strictly: release the agent before this backend.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
A user token obtained by an application other than the platform's own
registrations (for example a self-hosted AI client using on-behalf-of) was
accepted with the user's full role; only audience, issuer, signature and
lifetime were checked. Such tokens are now classified on every request.
- ClientAppBindingMiddleware (after authentication, before policy enforcement)
records the request dimensions ClientAppBinding (registered | unregistered |
unidentified) and ClientAppId, plus a throttled Warning.
- AdminConfiguration.EnforceClientAppBinding (default off; Admin > Settings >
Global): when on, a foreign client is refused with 403 ClientAppNotRegistered
unless the application is an enabled member of the caller's tenant (the
app:<client-id> row a service principal uses). An admitted caller keeps their
identity but gets the application caps: at most Viewer, no platform role,
DelegatedReader on managed tenants, roleless tiers closed except auth/mcp.
- AdminIdentity.IsCapped (application or admitted foreign client) is what the
global, delegated and member-role resolvers switch on; RequestContext carries it.
- Own clients = the audience trust set plus EntraId:TrustedClientAppIds, a
client-only trust for the local development registration that never widens
the accepted audiences.
- Tests: classification, unforgeable cap marker, middleware in both modes, caps
through the real policy middleware, pipeline order; manifests and wire types
regenerated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
SecurityValidator stamps ValidatedTenantId once the certificate tenant binding
(or the bootstrap token) proves the tenant, and DeviceValidation once the
device-validation chain has run: the admitting ValidatorType name, None for a
tenant without a validator, Transient for the 503, Rejected for the 403 of
stage device. RequestTelemetryMiddleware resolves the row's TenantId in one
place (policy tenant, proven tenant, then the X-Tenant-Id header only on the
routes that validate it) and copies DeviceValidation as a dimension.
Register, config and upload-url rows carried no TenantId before, so
tenant-filtered KQL missed exactly the calls that run the validation, and the
validators' success line is Information-level and never reaches App Insights.
Proving which validator admitted a device is now one query.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
The surface comes from the signed appidacr/azpacr claim (0 = public client = portal;
secret/certificate, app-only or missing = integration), never from a header: portal SPA,
MCP server and API share one app registration in production, so the client id cannot tell
them apart and any token holder controls headers. New AdminConfiguration field
PortalUserRateLimitRequestsPerMinute (default 600, Global Settings round-trip, wire types
regenerated); the existing user budget is relabelled MCP & integrations and keeps the tenant
override and the Pro floor; buckets are keyed per surface; ThrottleSurface is a request
dimension next to ClientSource so the classification is auditable (platform-health check 2).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- StorageClientOptions: Table/Queue 8 s per attempt × 3 attempts + capped backoffs = 25.8 s < the
agent's 30 s upload timeout (pinned by test); Blob 60 s × 4. Every production client takes its
options from there. No Polly over the SDK.
- StorageErrors.IsTransient(Exception): OperationCanceled / IO / HttpRequest / Aggregate-of-those
/ RequestFailed status 0; the ingest answers 503 + Retry-After instead of 500.
- The ingest still takes no caller cancellation (a batch is a unit). GetAllSessionsPageAsync
carries the request token down to BoundedFanOut (Global Admin list); SingleFlightCache hands its
factory a 30 s budget token and evicts on timeout (tenant ids, app-summary snapshot, session stats).
- ProcessStallMonitor: 1 s tick drift ≥ 1 s ⇒ ProcessStall event (sampling bypass) + metric with
cause gc / threadpool / unknown from GC.GetTotalPauseDuration and thread-pool counters;
GcPauseMs on request rows ≥ 100 ms. Measures the instance-local 5–10 s pauses seen in production.
- Gitlinks: internal (plan, D-203, concept doc, B-9hf, lesson), .claude/commands (marker rows).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
A service principal (idtyp=app, typically behind a federated credential) is admitted only
with the access_as_application application permission and then keys every role table,
binding, audit actor and throttle bucket as app:<client-id>. Caps at resolution: Viewer in a
tenant, DelegatedReader on managed tenants, never a platform role; the roleless catalog tiers
are closed to applications except GET auth/mcp. MCP guard keys on the same principal key.
Members / MCP Users / Delegated Access get a User / Service principal switch; usage views
badge App; McpServicePrincipalFirstSeen ops event and PrincipalKind request dimension.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
CWE-807: the kill switch was keyed only by the caller-declared X-Device-SerialNumber, so omitting or forging the header dodged block and kill. A block now mirrors onto the device's certificate identities (Sessions.OwnerDeviceId) as id:{guid} alias rows in BlockedDevices, resolved at block time; KillSwitchEvaluator checks serial, then identity, then version and stamps the DeviceIdentityBinding request dimension. Alias rows are hidden from listings and exempt from the legacy-key migration; unblock removes them. Session-scoped watchdog blocks were unreachable (no session id ever reached the evaluator): ingest now carries the verdict past the body parse and re-evaluates with the session id, and holds the registered serial against the block list when the header differs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Agent endpoints authenticated per tenant but authorized session writes on a caller-supplied
session id. Sessions rows now carry the creating device identity (cert thumbprint + Intune
device id from the CN, or bootstrap code + serial) in primary-only Owner* columns.
SessionOwnershipPolicy evaluates register / telemetry / error-report requests against it;
SessionOwnerBindingObserver records the outcome on the request row, as a warning and as a
throttled SessionOwnerMismatch ops event. Nothing is rejected in this stage.
Agent: errorCode parsing on 401/403, one-shot session rotation on session_owner_mismatch
without feeding the auth-failure tracker, spool drop, agent_started.sessionRotated.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Post-deploy verification of 249e39bc found zero AgentCertTenantBinding rows
across 32k agent requests. Cause: the Match outcome was emitted with
LogInformation, and worker-side ILogger below Warning never reaches App
Insights (provider default rule is Warning+, host forwarding of worker logs
is off). The bulk outcome was therefore invisible, which is indistinguishable
from the code never running — the shadow telemetry had no denominator.
Stamp every outcome onto the request row instead (FunctionContext.Items ->
RequestTelemetryMiddleware -> CertTenantBinding dimension). That row already
exists per request and is unsampled, so the denominator costs no extra
telemetry. Non-Match outcomes keep their Warning trace with full context.
FromCache existed only to sample the dead Match line and is removed with it.
Backend 4606/4606, 0 warnings.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
The V1 agent line is retired: no new V1 sessions since 2026-05-09, only
orphaned straggler traffic remained on /api/agent/ingest (last seen
2026-06-29, events for long-cleaned-up sessions). Bootstrap/Intune/CI
have deployed V2-only since the v2 cutover.
Agent:
- Delete AutopilotMonitor.Agent, .Agent.Core, .Agent.Core.Tests
(projects + sln entries). V2 trio, SummaryDialog, DecisionCore.Tests
and V2Isolation.targets stay.
Backend:
- Relocate the shared statics/DTOs V2 reused from the V1 partials
(StampServerFields, SanitizeEventTimestamps, IsMaxLifetimeAgentShutdown,
RecalculateAppDurations, EventClassification, AppInstallAggregationState)
into EventIngestProcessor; IngestEventsOutput moves next to
IngestTelemetryFunction (same namespace, zero ripple).
- Delete IngestEventsFunction (route agent/ingest), BootstrapIngestEvents
(route bootstrap/ingest), NdjsonParser and their DI registration.
EventDataNormalizer stays (used by TelemetryPayloadParser).
- Drop both routes from EndpointAccessPolicyCatalog and
RequestTelemetryMiddleware.TenantHeaderTrustedPaths.
- Retire the V1 update-hash oracle: LatestAgentV1*/LatestBootstrapV1*
fields + GetAgentLine case 1 (default arm returns empty hashes, so
stragglers gracefully skip the integrity check; ParseAgentMajor keeps
its default of 1 on purpose — defaulting to 2 would feed V2 hashes to
V1 binaries). TableConfigRepository Store+Map updated in lockstep.
- Remove ApiEndpoints.IngestEvents/.BootstrapIngestEvents constants.
Tests: NdjsonParserTests deleted; timestamp/critical-path/max-lifetime
tests repointed to EventIngestProcessor; the two NDJSON pipeline tests
removed (coverage retained by direct-list siblings); catalog/no-store
InlineData rows updated.
Docs: architecture.md (endpoint tables, ingest flow diagram, solution
layout, test matrix), web SectionAgentInternals endpoint tables,
build.ps1 help text.
Azure: no config change needed — /api/agent is not in the client-cert
exclusion paths (agent/ingest was always cert-enforced) and the
/api/bootstrap prefix exclusion remains for the surviving bootstrap
routes (verified via ARM on autopilotmonitor-api).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Setting requestTelemetry.Context.Location.Ip never reached the requests
table: App Insights uses the IP only for geo-lookup then masks the stored
client_IP to 0.0.0.0 (verified — every request in the resource shows
0.0.0.0). On top of that, the only IP reaching the isolated worker is an
Azure-infra hop (West Europe / Amsterdam), not the device's real egress IP
(device geo = Falkenstein). A usable device IP would need a non-masked
custom property AND the correct forwarded header (Front-Door-topology
dependent) — not worth it: TenantId + CorrelationId already isolate a
device (they dissolved the IngestTelemetry "multiplication" illusion).
Remove the dead Context.Location.Ip block + now-unused Security using,
replace with a NOTE documenting why client_IP is intentionally absent so it
is not re-added. ClientIpExtractor.GetClientEgressIp stays (still used by
ReportDistressFunction's stored SourceIp, which is not App-Insights-masked).
Full backend suite 2249/2249 green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Makes the requests table actually usable for diagnosing agent traffic and rate
limits, without adding any new telemetry items — only properties on the already-
emitted, sampling-excluded Request telemetry (host.json excludedTypes "Request;
Event"), consistent with StorageDependencyFilterProcessor.
RequestTelemetryMiddleware:
- client_IP: the isolated worker behind Front Door/App Service left it 0.0.0.0.
Set Context.Location.Ip from X-Azure-ClientIP (Front Door's true client egress
IP) else trusted rightmost X-Forwarded-For. Header values are joined via
StringValues.ToString() so the rightmost trusted hop wins (not a spoofable
left entry). Diagnostic only — the rate limiter independently uses the trusted
hop, so a spoofed value here cannot affect throttling.
- TenantId: agent ingest skips PolicyEnforcementMiddleware so reqCtx.TenantId was
empty. Fall back to X-Tenant-Id, but ONLY on an exact allowlist of device
endpoints that actually validate it (agent telemetry/ingest/error/distress,
bootstrap ingest/error) and only when it is a well-formed GUID — a prefix match
would let anonymous/management routes (bootstrap/validate, bootstrap/sessions,
agent/config, …) be tagged with a spoofed tenant.
RateLimitService: 429 warning is now structured ({RequestsInWindow}/{MaxRequests}
/{WindowSeconds}/{RateLimitKeyPrefix}) so it's queryable; privacy-safe (8-char
prefix only — the key may be a cert thumbprint, bootstrap token, or UPN).
ReportDistressFunction: store the real device egress IP in SourceIp (table entry
+ AgentDistressReport event) via new ClientIpExtractor.GetClientEgressIp; the
rate-limit key keeps the un-spoofable trusted hop.
Full backend suite 2249/2249 green.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Track MCP tool invocations in App Insights and UserUsageLog:
- Add ClientSource + McpToolName custom dimensions to RequestTelemetry
- Propagate tool name via X-MCP-Tool-Name header from MCP server
- Wrap all 26 tool handlers with withToolTelemetry for context propagation
- Add MCP_TOOL_LOGGING env var (default false) for optional stderr logging
- Add toolLoggingEnabled param to Bicep template for persistence
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Oliver Kieselbach