diff --git a/.github/codeql/codeql-config.yml b/.github/codeql/codeql-config.yml
index 900b33b2..89e7ff65 100644
--- a/.github/codeql/codeql-config.yml
+++ b/.github/codeql/codeql-config.yml
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 # CodeQL configuration.
 #
-# The default query suites stay active — this file only filters out two C# queries
-# that fire structurally on this codebase, where the flagged behavior is the feature,
-# not a defect:
+# The default query suites stay active — this file only filters out queries that
+# fire structurally on this codebase, where the flagged behavior is the feature
+# or the protection exists in a form the query cannot see:
 #
 #   cs/exposure-of-sensitive-information
 #     Audit and operational logs record WHO performed an action (actor UPN / email)
@@ -15,10 +15,20 @@
 #     key. The IP is an identifier for throttling, not a secret at rest; storing it in
 #     the in-memory / table rate-limit key is by design.
 #
+#   js/missing-rate-limiting
+#     Only the MCP server has Express routes. Every one that does work is throttled by
+#     our own limiters (oauthRateLimit / oauthTokenRateLimit on /oauth/*, accessGuard
+#     on /mcp); /health and the OAuth discovery documents return static JSON.
+#     The query only recognizes limiters from npm packages (express-rate-limit and
+#     similar) and flags a route handler as soon as it calls a function named
+#     like *auth*, *login* or *verify*. So it reports throttled and unthrottled
+#     routes the same way, and every alert it ever raised was a false positive. The
+#     coverage check it stood in for is a test: every OAuth router route must carry
+#     a limiter or be named as exempt (MCP oauth-rate-limit.test.ts).
+#
 # Genuine one-off false positives from OTHER queries (e.g. an open-redirect the taint
-# model can't see is allow-listed, a rate-limited route it doesn't recognize) are
-# dismissed individually in the Security tab so those queries stay sharp — they are
-# NOT suppressed here.
+# model can't see is allow-listed) are dismissed individually in the Security tab so
+# those queries stay sharp — they are NOT suppressed here.
 #
 # Log-injection (cs/log-forging) is deliberately NOT filtered: user-controlled values
 # are sanitized at the sink via Helpers/LogSanitizer, so the query stays useful for
@@ -29,3 +39,5 @@ query-filters:
       id: cs/exposure-of-sensitive-information
   - exclude:
       id: cs/cleartext-storage-of-sensitive-information
+  - exclude:
+      id: js/missing-rate-limiting
diff --git a/internal b/internal
index b5a820a1..c5f2c400 160000
--- a/internal
+++ b/internal
@@ -1 +1 @@
-Subproject commit b5a820a1595e1b555affaec1c84a402a6874eaef
+Subproject commit c5f2c400774f1d39d9a87558a22304d98ec1e075
diff --git a/src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/__tests__/oauth-rate-limit.test.ts b/src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/__tests__/oauth-rate-limit.test.ts
index 3aa7a206..41322910 100644
--- a/src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/__tests__/oauth-rate-limit.test.ts
+++ b/src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/__tests__/oauth-rate-limit.test.ts
@@ -10,6 +10,10 @@
  * suites. No network is reached: every request fails validation (unsupported
  * grant / missing code) before the handler would call Entra, and the limiter
  * runs before the handler anyway.
+ *
+ * The last suite is the coverage check CodeQL's js/missing-rate-limiting stood
+ * in for (excluded, D-281): it cannot recognize these limiters, so every route
+ * of the OAuth router must carry one or be named as exempt here.
  */
 import { describe, it, expect, beforeAll, afterAll } from 'vitest';
 import express from 'express';
@@ -20,6 +24,7 @@ process.env.AUTOPILOT_ENTRA_CLIENT_ID ??= '00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000'
 process.env.MCP_OAUTH_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE = '3';
 process.env.MCP_OAUTH_TOKEN_RATE_LIMIT_PER_MINUTE = '2';
 const { createOAuthRouter } = await import('../oauth.js');
+const { oauthRateLimit, oauthTokenRateLimit } = await import('../access-guard.js');
 
 let server: Server;
 let baseUrl: string;
@@ -89,3 +94,44 @@ describe('/oauth/* per-source-IP rate limiting (R-3)', () => {
     expect((await token()).status).toBe(429);
   });
 });
+
+describe('every OAuth router route is throttled (D-281)', () => {
+  // The discovery documents are the only exemption: static JSON built from config and the request
+  // host, no outbound call, no state, no logging. Anything else needs a limiter as its first handler.
+  const UNTHROTTLED = [
+    'GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource/mcp',
+    'GET /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource',
+    'GET /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server',
+  ];
+
+  /** Each route of the OAuth router as `METHOD path` → the handler that runs first. */
+  function firstHandlers(): Map<string, unknown> {
+    const routes = new Map<string, unknown>();
+    for (const layer of createOAuthRouter().stack) {
+      // A router.use() middleware has no route and would escape the check below.
+      expect(layer.route, 'the OAuth router mounts routes only').toBeDefined();
+      for (const handler of layer.route!.stack) {
+        const key = `${(handler.method ?? 'all').toUpperCase()} ${layer.route!.path}`;
+        if (!routes.has(key)) routes.set(key, handler.handle);
+      }
+    }
+    return routes;
+  }
+
+  it('runs a per-IP limiter before every handler except the discovery documents', () => {
+    const routes = firstHandlers();
+    // Introspection sanity: the known surface is found (an Express upgrade that moves the stack fails here).
+    expect([...routes.keys()]).toEqual(expect.arrayContaining([
+      ...UNTHROTTLED, 'POST /oauth/register', 'GET /oauth/authorize', 'GET /oauth/callback', 'POST /oauth/token',
+    ]));
+
+    const unthrottled = [...routes].filter(([key, first]) =>
+      !UNTHROTTLED.includes(key) && first !== oauthRateLimit && first !== oauthTokenRateLimit,
+    ).map(([key]) => key);
+    expect(unthrottled).toEqual([]);
+  });
+
+  it('gives /oauth/token the strict budget — it is the route that calls Entra with the client secret', () => {
+    expect(firstHandlers().get('POST /oauth/token')).toBe(oauthTokenRateLimit);
+  });
+});
diff --git a/src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/access-guard.ts b/src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/access-guard.ts
index 2bc35905..4f924d75 100644
--- a/src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/access-guard.ts
+++ b/src/McpServer/autopilot-monitor-mcp/src/access-guard.ts
@@ -394,7 +394,8 @@ function respondRateLimited(res: Response, kind: RateLimitKind, key: string, rpc
  * map keyed `${kind}:${ip}` so the two surfaces cannot starve each other and
  * the strict token budget stays independent of the general one. Applied
  * per-route inside createOAuthRouter so any future /oauth endpoint must opt in
- * consciously rather than inherit silence.
+ * consciously rather than inherit silence — oauth-rate-limit.test.ts fails any
+ * router route that has no limiter and is not a named exemption (D-281).
  */
 function makeOAuthIpLimiter(kind: 'oauth' | 'oauth-token', limit: number) {
   return (req: Request, res: Response, next: NextFunction): void => {