diff --git a/src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/PolicyEnforcementMiddlewareTests.cs b/src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/PolicyEnforcementMiddlewareTests.cs index 655a431f..f33caed1 100644 --- a/src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/PolicyEnforcementMiddlewareTests.cs +++ b/src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Tests/PolicyEnforcementMiddlewareTests.cs @@ -1,12 +1,15 @@ using System.Security.Claims; using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Admin; using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Config; +using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Helpers; using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Middleware; using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Security; using AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Services; using AutopilotMonitor.Shared; using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.DataAccess; using AutopilotMonitor.Shared.Models; +using Microsoft.AspNetCore.Http; +using Microsoft.Azure.Functions.Worker; using Microsoft.Extensions.Caching.Memory; using Microsoft.Extensions.Logging.Abstractions; using Moq; @@ -1123,6 +1126,126 @@ public class PolicyEnforcementMiddlewareTests Assert.True(result.Allowed); } + /// + /// Operator reads whose ?tenantId= is a handler-side filter for a Global Admin / Global Reader: session reports + /// (GA-only AdminNote, submitter contact data), rule submissions (contact e-mail, reviewer, review comment), a + /// tenant's MCP usage (its accounts and their tools) and verdict calibration (classifier diagnostics, drift + /// alerts). None of it is the managed tenant's telemetry, so a delegated (MSP) reader never reaches them. + /// + public static TheoryData OperatorFilterReads => new() + { + "/api/global/session-reports", + "/api/global/rule-submissions", + "/api/global/metrics/mcp-usage", + "/api/global/metrics/mcp-usage/daily", + "/api/global/metrics/verdict-calibration", + }; + + [Theory] + [MemberData(nameof(OperatorFilterReads))] + public async Task Delegated_OperatorFilterReads_WithManagedTenantId_AreForbidden(string path) + { + const string upn = "msp@partner.example"; + var h = BuildHarness(); + h.AsDelegated(TenantB); + + var result = await h.Middleware.DecideAsync("GET", path, TenantB, AuthedPrincipal(TenantA, upn)); + + Assert.False(result.Allowed); + Assert.Equal(403, result.StatusCode); + } + + [Theory] + [MemberData(nameof(OperatorFilterReads))] + public async Task GlobalReader_OperatorFilterReads_WithTenantFilter_StayAllowed(string path) + { + const string upn = "reader@vendor.example"; + var h = BuildHarness(); + h.AsGlobalRole(Constants.GlobalRoles.GlobalReader); + + var result = await h.Middleware.DecideAsync("GET", path, TenantB, AuthedPrincipal(TenantA, upn)); + + Assert.True(result.Allowed); + Assert.True(result.Context!.IsGlobalReader); + } + + // ── Invoke adapter: the tenantId the middleware authorizes is the one the handler reads ── + // Handlers read req.Query (HttpUtility.ParseQueryString), which comma-joins a repeated key. Deciding on the + // first value alone let ?tenantId=B&tenantId=C pass the cross-tenant check on B while the handler read "B,C". + + private static async Task<(bool NextCalled, int StatusCode, RequestContext? Context)> InvokeAsync( + Harness h, string path, string queryString, ClaimsPrincipal principal) + { + var http = new DefaultHttpContext(); + http.Request.Method = "GET"; + http.Request.Path = path; + http.Request.QueryString = new QueryString(queryString); + http.Response.Body = new MemoryStream(); + var items = new Dictionary { ["HttpRequestContext"] = http, ["ClaimsPrincipal"] = principal }; + var context = new Mock(); + context.SetupGet(c => c.Items).Returns(items); + + var nextCalled = false; + await h.Middleware.Invoke(context.Object, _ => { nextCalled = true; return Task.CompletedTask; }); + items.TryGetValue(RequestContext.ItemsKey, out var resolved); + return (nextCalled, http.Response.StatusCode, resolved as RequestContext); + } + + [Fact] + public async Task Invoke_RepeatedTenantId_DelegatedReader_IsForbidden() + { + // B is managed, C is not — the handler would read "B,C", so the decision is taken on "B,C". + const string tenantC = "33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333"; + var h = BuildHarness(); + h.AsDelegated(TenantB); + + var run = await InvokeAsync(h, "/api/global/metrics/fleet-health", $"?tenantId={TenantB}&tenantId={tenantC}", + AuthedPrincipal(TenantA, "msp@partner.example")); + + Assert.False(run.NextCalled); + Assert.Equal(403, run.StatusCode); + } + + [Fact] + public async Task Invoke_ManagedTenantId_DelegatedReader_IsAdmitted() + { + var h = BuildHarness(); + h.AsDelegated(TenantB); + + var run = await InvokeAsync(h, "/api/global/metrics/fleet-health", $"?tenantId={TenantB}", + AuthedPrincipal(TenantA, "msp@partner.example")); + + Assert.True(run.NextCalled); + Assert.True(run.Context!.IsDelegatedReader); + Assert.Equal(TenantB, run.Context.TargetTenantId); + } + + [Theory] + [InlineData("?tenantId=22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222")] + [InlineData("?tenantId=22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222&tenantId=33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333")] + [InlineData("?tenantid=22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222&TENANTID=33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333")] + [InlineData("?tenantId=&tenantId=33333333-3333-3333-3333-333333333333")] + // Encoded keys: %49 is 'I' on both paths. Only HttpUtility decodes the non-standard %u0049, but the handler + // parses Url.Query, where System.Uri has already escaped the stray '%' — neither path sees a tenantId. + [InlineData("?tenant%49d=22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222")] + [InlineData("?tenant%u0049d=22222222-2222-2222-2222-222222222222")] + public async Task Invoke_TargetTenantId_IsTheValueTheHandlerReads(string queryString) + { + const string path = "/api/global/metrics/fleet-health"; + var h = BuildHarness(); + h.AsGlobalRole(Constants.GlobalRoles.GlobalAdmin); + + var run = await InvokeAsync(h, path, queryString, AuthedPrincipal(TenantA, "ga@vendor.example")); + + // The handler's view: req.Query over the request Url (QueryParamGuardTests pins that implementation). + var handlerRequest = new Mock(Mock.Of()) { CallBase = true }; + handlerRequest.SetupGet(r => r.Url).Returns(new Uri("https://localhost" + path + queryString)); + var handlerTenantId = handlerRequest.Object.Query["tenantId"]; + + Assert.True(run.NextCalled); + Assert.Equal(string.IsNullOrWhiteSpace(handlerTenantId) ? TenantA : handlerTenantId, run.Context!.TargetTenantId); + } + [Fact] public async Task Delegated_CustomsArchive_OnManagedTenant_IsForbidden_ExcludeDelegated() { @@ -1274,6 +1397,7 @@ public class PolicyEnforcementMiddlewareTests [InlineData("GET", "/api/global/distress-reports", TenantScoping.None)] // ops-events is platform-OPERATIONAL data — GA/Reader-only by intent (not a can't-bound limit), so None. [InlineData("GET", "/api/global/ops-events", TenantScoping.None)] + // Operator reads with a ?tenantId= filter: OperatorFilterReads above. public void GlobalRoute_DelegatedAccessibility_MatchesContract(string method, string path, TenantScoping expected) { var entry = EndpointAccessPolicyCatalog.FindPolicy(method, path); @@ -1282,6 +1406,63 @@ public class PolicyEnforcementMiddlewareTests Assert.Equal(expected, entry.TenantScoping); } + // ── Catalog ratchet: every platform route a delegated (MSP) caller reaches is a deliberate entry ── + // QueryParam/RouteParam on a GlobalReadOrAdmin route admits a delegated reader of the named tenant, whether the + // author meant an authorization scope or only a handler-side filter — that is how session reports and a tenant's + // MCP accounts once reached MSP callers. A route belongs on this list only if its handler binds to the named + // tenant AND returns that tenant's own data: no operator notes or review comments, no contact data, no account + // lists, no platform-internal diagnostics. Anything else stays None (the handler can still read ?tenantId= + // itself) or carries excludeDelegated. The subset tier admits a delegated caller on the bounded aggregate. + private static readonly string[] DelegatedReachablePlatformRoutes = + { + "GET config/all", + "GET global/apps/analytics", + "GET global/apps/list", + "GET global/apps/sessions", + "GET global/audit/logs", + "GET global/metrics/agent-efficiency", + "GET global/metrics/app", + "GET global/metrics/device-journeys", + "GET global/metrics/fleet-health", + "GET global/metrics/geographic", + "GET global/metrics/geographic/sessions", + "GET global/metrics/rule-stats", + "GET global/metrics/sla", + "GET global/metrics/summary", + "GET global/metrics/time-attribution", + "GET global/metrics/usage", + "GET global/metrics/vulnerability", + "GET global/raw/events", + "GET global/raw/sessions", + "GET global/rules/analyze", + "GET global/rules/gather", + "GET global/search/sessions", + "GET global/search/sessions-by-cve", + "GET global/search/sessions-by-event", + "GET global/session-annotations", + "GET global/sessions", + "GET global/stats/sessions", + "GET vulnerability/software-inventory", + }; + + [Fact] + public void DelegatedReachablePlatformRoutes_AreTheSanctionedSet() + { + var reachable = EndpointAccessPolicyCatalog.Entries + .Where(e => e.Policy == EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrDelegatedSubset + || (e.Policy == EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin + && (e.TenantScoping is TenantScoping.QueryParam or TenantScoping.RouteParam) + && !e.ExcludeDelegated)) + .Select(e => $"{e.HttpMethod} {e.RouteTemplate}") + .ToArray(); + + var added = reachable.Except(DelegatedReachablePlatformRoutes).ToArray(); + var removed = DelegatedReachablePlatformRoutes.Except(reachable).ToArray(); + Assert.True(added.Length == 0 && removed.Length == 0, + $"Delegated-reachable platform routes changed. Added: [{string.Join(", ", added)}] — decide per the rule " + + $"above (None / excludeDelegated, or add it to the list). Removed: [{string.Join(", ", removed)}]."); + } + // ── Catalog contract: platform-operational GA/Reader-only reads carry ExcludeDelegated ── // The None-equivalent for {tenantId}-RouteParam routes (which the {tenantId}-convention forbids from // being None): GlobalReadOrAdmin keeps GA + read-only Reader, ExcludeDelegated removes the delegated rescue. diff --git a/src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Reports/GetSessionReportsFunction.cs b/src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Reports/GetSessionReportsFunction.cs index 673b8521..dc1ca893 100644 --- a/src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Reports/GetSessionReportsFunction.cs +++ b/src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Functions/Reports/GetSessionReportsFunction.cs @@ -31,7 +31,8 @@ namespace AutopilotMonitor.Functions.Functions.Reports try { - // Authentication + GlobalAdminOnly authorization enforced by PolicyEnforcementMiddleware + // Authentication + GlobalReadOrAdmin authorization enforced by PolicyEnforcementMiddleware. The route is + // unscoped on purpose: ?tenantId= is a filter, and no delegated (MSP) reader may reach the AdminNote. var callerTenantId = TenantHelper.GetTenantId(req); var query = req.Query; diff --git a/src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Middleware/PolicyEnforcementMiddleware.cs b/src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Middleware/PolicyEnforcementMiddleware.cs index bb955f46..563068c3 100644 --- a/src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Middleware/PolicyEnforcementMiddleware.cs +++ b/src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Middleware/PolicyEnforcementMiddleware.cs @@ -72,7 +72,11 @@ public class PolicyEnforcementMiddleware : IFunctionsWorkerMiddleware var requestPath = httpContext.Request.Path.Value ?? string.Empty; var httpMethod = httpContext.Request.Method; - var queryTenantId = httpContext.Request.Query["tenantId"].FirstOrDefault(); + // Joined like the handlers' req.Query, which comma-joins a repeated key (empty values included): the + // cross-tenant decision is taken on the very string the handler reads, never on the first of several values. + var queryTenantId = httpContext.Request.Query.TryGetValue("tenantId", out var tenantIdValues) + ? string.Join(",", tenantIdValues.ToArray()) + : null; // Sanitized copies for logging only — never used for routing/authorization decisions. var logPath = LogSanitizer.Clean(requestPath); diff --git a/src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/EndpointAccessPolicyCatalog.cs b/src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/EndpointAccessPolicyCatalog.cs index 66f9de9e..3d32216c 100644 --- a/src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/EndpointAccessPolicyCatalog.cs +++ b/src/Backend/AutopilotMonitor.Functions/Security/EndpointAccessPolicyCatalog.cs @@ -17,7 +17,11 @@ public enum TenantScoping /// TenantId comes from {tenantId} route parameter. Middleware enforces cross-tenant check. RouteParam, - /// TenantId comes from ?tenantId= query parameter (optional, falls back to JWT tenant). Middleware enforces cross-tenant check. + /// + /// TenantId comes from ?tenantId= query parameter (optional, falls back to JWT tenant). Middleware enforces cross-tenant check. + /// On a delegated read tier (GlobalReadOrAdmin included) this also admits a delegated (MSP) reader of the named tenant — + /// a platform route whose ?tenantId= is only a handler-side filter stays . + /// QueryParam, } @@ -557,7 +561,9 @@ public static class EndpointAccessPolicyCatalog new("GET", "global/metrics/fleet-health", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin, TenantScoping.QueryParam), new("GET", "global/metrics/time-attribution", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin, TenantScoping.QueryParam), new("GET", "global/metrics/device-journeys", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin, TenantScoping.QueryParam), - new("GET", "global/metrics/verdict-calibration", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin, TenantScoping.QueryParam), + // Operator-only classifier diagnostics and drift alerts; the handler reads ?tenantId= itself. None, so no + // delegated (MSP) reader reaches them. + new("GET", "global/metrics/verdict-calibration", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin), new("GET", "global/apps/list", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin, TenantScoping.QueryParam), new("GET", "global/apps/analytics", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin, TenantScoping.QueryParam), new("GET", "global/apps/sessions", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin, TenantScoping.QueryParam), @@ -567,19 +573,24 @@ public static class EndpointAccessPolicyCatalog new("GET", "global/metrics/sla", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin, TenantScoping.QueryParam), new("GET", "global/metrics/rule-stats", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin, TenantScoping.QueryParam), new("GET", "global/metrics/vulnerability", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin, TenantScoping.QueryParam), - new("GET", "global/metrics/mcp-usage", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin, TenantScoping.QueryParam), - new("GET", "global/metrics/mcp-usage/daily", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin, TenantScoping.QueryParam), - // One tenant's organization usage by account (?tenantId= read by the handler): deliberately None, not - // QueryParam — the route enumerates accounts (UPNs), which the delegated path must never reach. + // A named tenant's MCP use — its accounts (UPNs) and their tools, the daily counts, the organization view. + // The handlers read ?tenantId= themselves: deliberately None, not QueryParam, so the delegated path never + // reaches them. + new("GET", "global/metrics/mcp-usage", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin), + new("GET", "global/metrics/mcp-usage/daily", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin), new("GET", "global/metrics/mcp-usage/organization", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin), new("GET", "global/distress-reports", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin), - new("GET", "global/session-reports", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin, TenantScoping.QueryParam), + // The operator's report queue: GA-only AdminNote, the submitter's comment and contact data. ?tenantId= is a + // filter the handler reads itself; None, so no delegated reader reaches it. + new("GET", "global/session-reports", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin), // Mints the HMAC ticket for the anonymous proxied stream above (the MCP's report download). new("POST", "global/session-reports/download-ticket", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin), new("GET", "global/session-reports/download-url", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin), new("PATCH", "global/session-reports/{reportId}/note", EndpointPolicy.GlobalAdminOnly), // Community rule submissions, operator side: cross-tenant read (Global Reader included), decision GA-only. - new("GET", "global/rule-submissions", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin, TenantScoping.QueryParam), + // The list carries the contact e-mail and the review; ?tenantId= is a filter the handler reads itself, None + // so no delegated reader reaches it (the tenant's own list, rules/submissions, is admin-only). + new("GET", "global/rule-submissions", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin), new("GET", "global/rule-submissions/{submissionId}", EndpointPolicy.GlobalReadOrAdmin), new("PATCH", "global/rule-submissions/{submissionId}", EndpointPolicy.GlobalAdminOnly), new("DELETE", "global/rule-submissions/{submissionId}", EndpointPolicy.GlobalAdminOnly), diff --git a/src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/analyze-rules/page.tsx b/src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/analyze-rules/page.tsx index d0a04649..4f8223ff 100644 --- a/src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/analyze-rules/page.tsx +++ b/src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/analyze-rules/page.tsx @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ import { fetchJson, jsonBody } from "@/lib/apiClient"; import { useWindowDays } from "@/hooks/useWindowDays"; import { utcDateDaysAgo } from "@/lib/timeWindow"; import { CommunityContributionBox } from "@/components/rules/CommunityContributionBox"; -import { MySubmissionsList } from "@/components/rules/MySubmissionsList"; +import { MySubmissionsList, isSubmissionsAdminOnly } from "@/components/rules/MySubmissionsList"; import { SubmitRulesModal } from "@/components/rules/SubmitRulesModal"; /** Rule telemetry window without `?days=` — the backend's own rule-stats default (today−30 … today). */ @@ -133,9 +133,7 @@ function AnalyzeRulesContent() { // A read-only Global Reader — and an own-tenant admin viewing a FOREIGN tenant (cross-tenant override) — // is read-only. Backend also enforces (rules write is TenantAdminOrGA, cross-tenant blocked for non-GA). const isReadOnly = !(user?.isGlobalAdmin || (user?.isTenantAdmin && !isGlobalOverride)); - // Community submissions are TenantAdminOrGA on the own tenant; only a global-scope override reads them through - // the operator list. Everyone else (Operator, Viewer) gets a hint instead of a 403 on the list call. - const submissionsAdminOnly = isReadOnly && !isGlobalOverride; + const submissionsAdminOnly = isSubmissionsAdminOnly(isReadOnly, scope); // Cross-tenant write routing: in a Global Admin override the JWT-scoped rules/analyze/{id} route // resolves the tenant from the caller's token and would silently upsert into the GA's OWN tenant diff --git a/src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/gather-rules/page.tsx b/src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/gather-rules/page.tsx index ef2d19ad..2e5d5b55 100644 --- a/src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/gather-rules/page.tsx +++ b/src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/app/gather-rules/page.tsx @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ import { DocsLink } from "@/components/DocsLink"; import type { TenantFeatureFlagsResponse } from "@/lib/generated/wire-types.generated"; import { fetchJson } from "@/lib/apiClient"; import { CommunityContributionBox } from "@/components/rules/CommunityContributionBox"; -import { MySubmissionsList } from "@/components/rules/MySubmissionsList"; +import { MySubmissionsList, isSubmissionsAdminOnly } from "@/components/rules/MySubmissionsList"; import { SubmitRulesModal } from "@/components/rules/SubmitRulesModal"; export default function GatherRulesPage() { @@ -83,9 +83,7 @@ export default function GatherRulesPage() { // A read-only Global Reader — and an own-tenant admin viewing a FOREIGN tenant (cross-tenant override) — // is read-only. Backend also enforces (rules write is TenantAdminOrGA, cross-tenant blocked for non-GA). const isReadOnly = !(user?.isGlobalAdmin || (user?.isTenantAdmin && !isGlobalOverride)); - // Community submissions are TenantAdminOrGA on the own tenant; only a global-scope override reads them through - // the operator list. Everyone else (Operator, Viewer) gets a hint instead of a 403 on the list call. - const submissionsAdminOnly = isReadOnly && !isGlobalOverride; + const submissionsAdminOnly = isSubmissionsAdminOnly(isReadOnly, scope); // Cross-tenant write routing: in a Global Admin override the JWT-scoped rules/gather/{id} route // resolves the tenant from the caller's token and would silently upsert into the GA's OWN tenant diff --git a/src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/components/rules/MySubmissionsList.tsx b/src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/components/rules/MySubmissionsList.tsx index d1c13dd7..c6b8b053 100644 --- a/src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/components/rules/MySubmissionsList.tsx +++ b/src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/components/rules/MySubmissionsList.tsx @@ -30,6 +30,18 @@ export function submissionStatusBadge(status: string): { label: string; cls: str } } +/** + * Whether a rule page shows the admin-only hint instead of the list. Submissions are TenantAdminOrGA on the own + * tenant, and only a platform-scope (Global Admin / Global Reader) override reads a foreign tenant's through the + * operator list — a delegated (MSP) reader gets the hint like an Operator or Viewer instead of a 403. + */ +export function isSubmissionsAdminOnly( + isReadOnly: boolean, + scope: { isGlobalOverride: boolean; isDelegatedScope: boolean }, +): boolean { + return isReadOnly && !(scope.isGlobalOverride && !scope.isDelegatedScope); +} + /** * The tenant's own community submissions of one rule kind. Pending rows are the ones an admin * wants to see, so they show by default; decided and withdrawn rows sit behind "Show all". Renders diff --git a/src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/components/rules/__tests__/isSubmissionsAdminOnly.test.ts b/src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/components/rules/__tests__/isSubmissionsAdminOnly.test.ts new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d834f26b --- /dev/null +++ b/src/Web/autopilot-monitor-web/components/rules/__tests__/isSubmissionsAdminOnly.test.ts @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +import { describe, it, expect } from "vitest"; +import { isSubmissionsAdminOnly } from "../MySubmissionsList"; + +describe("isSubmissionsAdminOnly", () => { + it("lists a foreign tenant's submissions for a platform-scope override", () => { + expect(isSubmissionsAdminOnly(true, { isGlobalOverride: true, isDelegatedScope: false })).toBe(false); + }); + + it("shows a delegated (MSP) reader the hint on a managed tenant — the operator list is closed to them", () => { + expect(isSubmissionsAdminOnly(true, { isGlobalOverride: true, isDelegatedScope: true })).toBe(true); + }); + + it("shows an own-tenant Operator or Viewer the hint", () => { + expect(isSubmissionsAdminOnly(true, { isGlobalOverride: false, isDelegatedScope: false })).toBe(true); + }); + + it("lists the own tenant's submissions for its admin, also one who is a delegated reader elsewhere", () => { + expect(isSubmissionsAdminOnly(false, { isGlobalOverride: false, isDelegatedScope: false })).toBe(false); + expect(isSubmissionsAdminOnly(false, { isGlobalOverride: false, isDelegatedScope: true })).toBe(false); + }); +});